

# The EU as a trade policy actor

Presentation by Arne Melchior, NUPI EUNOR seminar 8 October 2015

# Background

- Forthcoming book, October 2015, now being printed
  - Arne Melchior & Ulf Sverdrup (eds.): Interessekonflikter i norsk handelspolitikk, Universitetsforlaget
    Mainly funded by FHF (Norwegian Seafood Research Fund)

  - Chapter 3: Some co-funding from RCN/EUNOR project
  - Interdisciplinary book: Economics, political science, history
  - Analysis of Norway's trade negotiations over 150 years
- Focus on issue linkage in negotiations
  - · Defensive and offensive interests, how can they be combined?
  - · Currently: Fish vs. agriculture
  - · Scientific contribution on debated issues
- Chapter 3: EU as a trade policy actor
  - Arne Melchior & Ulf Sverdrup, kapittel 3, s. 59-85, EU som handelspolitisk aktør
  - Based on review and some new evidence from interviews and open sources

#### Relevance: Norway-EU negotiations in 2015

- On EFTA/Norway contribution to economic and social cohesion in the EU ("EEA contribution")
  - · Large increases in earlier negotiations
- On about 50 tariff rate quotas for seafood
  - · Accumulated over time, due to EU enlargement
  - · Some quotas provided as "payment" for "EEA contribution"
- · On market access in agriculture
  - · Biannual reviews under Art. 19 of the EEA
  - · Former agreements in 2002 and 2010
- Three issues, separate rooms, same leadership
  - Were they linked in "integrative" or "synergistic" bargaining?
  - · Ex post: Two of them, but not the third

## EU as a trade policy actor – drivers of change

- EU enlargement
  - Induced changes in EU policies (e.g. treaties, agricultural policy, cohesion policy)
  - · Larger economic heterogeneity, change in industrial profile
    - · EU turned into net exporter in agriculture
    - New member states exporters of agriculture and fish
- Lisbon treaty
  - · Common policy area expanded, also for trade policy
  - European parliament larger role
  - New "foreign minister" and "foreign ministry" (EEAS)
- Economic crisis?
  - · Fatigue more than protectionism

#### EU – one or many actors in trade policy?

- EU only the sum of country interests?
  - Early days trade policy settled in Article 113 committee
  - Bargaining between nations still important
  - · But growing role for common policies and institutions
- Contradictions between DGs also play an important role
- EEAS new face but so far not a radical shift in EU trade policy coordination
- Parliament increased power due to "veto right"
  - Illustration: TTIP delay, spring 2015
  - · May lead to more "politicizing" of trade policy

### Issues for Norway-EU trade negotiations

- New treaties and more majority voting render it less likely that individual EU countries block negotiations
- EU interests have changed over time
- EEA Agreement stable framework leading to "business as usual"
  - · EU perception of "balance" in relationship with Norway
  - · Contrast: Switzerland perception of conflict
  - · Switzerland: All issues linked
- Norway-EU: Weaker issue linkages
  - · EEA contributions and seafood quotas were linked
  - Agriculture: Not yet
  - Possible reasons on the EU side: "Balance", pragmatism, fear of conflict, fatigue

### Should there be more issue linkages?

- Link between seafood market access and "EEA contribution" – less efficient then before since the "fish protagonists" are no longer receiving the EEA funds
  - Before enlargement: Spain received 59% of EEA contribution
- A linkage between market access for seafood and agriculture could work
  - But the EU must be interested in such a linkage
- Few other "tools" for Norwegian trade negotiators
  - Norway politically forced to be careful on agriculture
  - Might change in the future, due to changes in the trade policy scene
  - · Also strong economic arguments, analyzed in the book

## Mysteries of the "cheese tariff"

- Norway "bound" agricultural tariffs are more than twice the level of "applied" tariffs
  - · Can we use this "tariff overhang" and raise tariffs as we wish?
  - · According to some, yes
  - From the legal WTO text it is possible
  - · Example: Tariff increases for meat and cheese, 2013
- But international negotiations also establish norms of interpretation beyond the legal paragraphs
  - Textile trade policies of the 1980s an illustration
  - · If we violate the norms, there may be a recoil
  - · Strong reactions on the "cheese tariff" in the EU
  - Remains to be seen how strong is the "cheese tariff recoil"

# The forthcoming book

- · Economic and institutional analysis of trade negotiatons
- · Extensive review of issue linkages historically
  - · Negotiations on EU membership 1972, 1994
  - · Negotiations on establishing the EEA
  - · GATT and WTO negotiations
  - Bilateral trade agreements back to 1850 (and 1200)
- Several cases of "synergistic bargaining" also for agriculture
- But from the late 1950s: Defensive position in agriculture has limited Norway's margin of maneouvre
- Book launch seminar: NUPI 21 October 2015